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1. Introduction
While there is a huge literature on optimum tari¤s and tari¤ wars,
most studies of those topics are set in a static framework andintertem-A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 2
poral analysesare few. Moreover, the intertemporal models are mainly
applications of repeated games containing no inherent dynamics: the
stocks of assets or productive factors remain the same over time. To
our knowledge, there is no paper which formulates a dynamic general
equilibrium model of international trade in which the governments
play a tari¤-setting game, and which derives a feedback-Nash equilib-
rium pair of tari¤ strategies and characterizes it. We aim to do this
job in this paper.
As it will become evident, our di¤erential-game model relies on
rather speci…c assumptions. However, at the same time, we believe
that it hasseveral virtues.First, althoughthereare two statevariables,
one in eachcountry, we are abletosimplifythe di¤erential-game model
in such a way that e¤ectively one state variable can be eliminated.
Therefore, we can avoid the di¢culty that would arise from having
to deal with Markov-perfect tari¤ strategy as a function of two state
variables1. Second, due to the model speci…city, we can explicitly
derivethe feedback-Nash equilibrium pair oftari¤ strategiesandeasily
analyze how it depends on the economic fundamentals of the model.
Third, the model is very simple and its tractability may facilitate
applications to other problems concerning optimum tari¤s and tari¤
war.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 simpli…es it for tractabil-
ity. Section 4 explicitly derives the optimum tari¤ set by one of the
government under the assumption that the other government is com-
mitted to either free trade or a constant tari¤ rate. Section 5 for-
mulates a tari¤-setting game and explicitly derives a Markov-perfect
pair of strategies to characterize. Section 6 compare the welfare level
of each country among autarchic, free-trade, unilateral and bilateral
optimum-tari¤ equilibria. Section 7 concludes. The appendices show
1As we show in the Appendix, Markov-perfect strategies are obtained by solving
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation which is a di¤erential equation. If
there are multiple state variables, the HJB equation becomes a partial di¤erential
equation in which the solution is a function of multiple state variables. It is well
known that partial di¤erential equations are, in general, very di¤cult to solve.A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 3
an alternative method of arriving at the same solution.
2. The Model
Our dynamic model is based on the one developed by Shimomura
(1993) which investigated the implications of time preference for the
trade pattern. There are two countries, the home and the foreign,
bothproducingtwotradable goods, rice and cars. Rice is non-durable,
while cars are durable. Both goods are pure consumption goods, that
is, neither is a factor of production. Each car provides one unit of ser-
vice ‡ow per unit of time. Newly produced cars are tradable, but ex-
isting cars are internationally immobile, just like the investment good
in Oniki and Uzawa (1965). There exists a domestic rental market for
existing cars in each country. All markets are perfectly competitive.
The (in…nitely-livedandperfectly farsighted) representative house-






A = Y (pT) + r(A¡ B) ¡pTc¡ ±A +¢ (2)
where c is the consumption of rice, B is the service ‡ow from the cars
that the householduses, A is the stock of cars owned by the household
(implying that A ¡ B is the quantity of cars the household leases to
other households), r is the rental rate of a car, p is the world price of
rice in terms of car, pT is the corresponding internal (i.e., domestic)
price, ½ is the rate of time preference, ± is the rate of depreciation of
cars, Y (pT) is the GNP function, and ¢ is the lumpsum transfer of
the tari¤ revenue to each household. The felicity function u(c;B) is
twice-di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave in c and B. We
de…ne T ´ 1+ ¿, where ¿ is the ad valorem tari¤ on rice imposed by
the home government.A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 4
There is a large number of households, each treating ¢, T; p and
r, as known and given functions of time. (Strictly speaking, we have
a continuum of identical households, and the measure of this contin-
uum is one). Clearly, in equilibrium, since all households in the home
countries are identical, we have A ¡ B = 0 and
¢ = p(T ¡ 1)(c ¡ YP(pT))
where YP(pT) ´ d
d(pT)Y(pT) is the output of rice in the home country.
Notice that Y (pT) + r(A ¡ B) + ¢ ¡ pTc, being the excess of
the household’s income over its expenditure on rice, represents its
purchase of new cars. (It is implicit in this formulation is that there
is no international borrowing; thus trade balance is zero at each point
of time.)
We now derive the necessary conditions for the household’s opti-
mization problem.
De…ne the Hamiltonian as
H = u(c;B) + ¸[Y (pT)+ r(A¡ B) ¡ pTc¡ ±A+ ¢] (3)
where ¸ is the co-state variable. The optimality conditions are
@H
@c
= uc(c;B) ¡ ¸pT = 0 (4)
@H
@B
= uB(c;B) ¡ ¸r = 0 (5)
²
¸ = (½ +± ¡ r)¸ (6)
and the transversality condition is
lim
t!1
A(t)¸(t)exp(¡½t) = 0 (7)
A parallel formulation applies to the foreign country. Indicating
the variables and functions belonging to the foreign country by means
of an asterisk (*), we have
²
A¤ = Y ¤(pT¤) +r¤(A¤ ¡ B¤)¡ pT¤c¤¡ ±
¤A¤ +¢¤; (8)A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 5
where ¢¤ ´ p(T¤ ¡ 1)(c ¡ Y ¤
P(pT ¤)) = p(1 ¡ T ¤)(Y ¤
P(pT¤) ¡ c) can
be interpreted as the foreign country’s revenue from taxing its rice
exports (see the remark below).
Remark 1: The following observations concerning the tari¤s may
be useful. To …x ideas, suppose the home country imports rice and
exports cars. The world price of rice in terms of cars (i.e., the inverse
of the home country’s terms of trade) is p. The home country imposes
an ad valorem tari¤ rate ¿ > 0 on rice. Hence the home country’s
internal price ratio is pint = p(1+¿) > p. This causes home consumers
to substitute away from rice. The foreign country, which imports cars,
can impose an ad valorem tari¤ on cars. But, by Lerner’s symmetry
theorem2, this is equivalent to the foreign country taxing its exports
of rice. Since p is the international price of rice (in terms of cars), an
export tax on rice at the rate ² > 0 will result in aninternal price ratio
(in the foreign country) of p¤
int = p(1¡²) ´ pT¤ < p. (For example, if
p = 100 and ² = 20%, then rice producers in the foreign country will
get a net revenue of 80 for each unit of rice they export; if they sell in
the internal market, they also get p¤
int = 80. In what follows, we will
refer to T and T¤ as the home and foreign tari¤ factors.
The necessary conditions for the optimization problem of the rep-
2According to Lerner’s symmetry, an ad valorem export tax at the rate ² on the
world price of the exported good is equivalent to an ad valorem tari¤ at the rate
￿= ²=(1¡ ²) on the world price of the imported good. See, for example, Vousden
(1991). For example, let the nominal world prices of rice and cars be ¦R
W =
$100and ¦C
W = $10. The foreign country exports rice, and imposes an export tax
of 20% (i.e. ² = :2). The internal price of rice is then ¦R
int = (1 ¡ :20)¦R
W = $80;
and the internal price of cars is ¦C
int = $10. The internal relative price of rice
is p¤
int = (1 ¡ ²)¦R
W=¦C
W = 8. Alternatively, the foreign country can impose a
tari¤ ￿ on imported cars. The internal price of car is then ¦C
int = (1 + ￿)¦C
W
and the internal price of car is ¦R
int = ¦R
W = $100. The internal relative price
of rice is p¤
int = ¦R
W=[¦C
W(1 + ￿)] = 8 if and only if (1 ¡ ²) = 1=(1 + ￿ ), i.e.,
￿= ²=(1 ¡ ²) = 0:25.A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 6




























¤t) = 0 (12)
Finally, the market-clearing conditions are
c+ c
¤ = YP(pT) + YP(pT
¤) (13)
A¡ B = 0 (14)
A¤ ¡ B¤ = 0 (15)
Note that we assume that there is no world rental market for existing
cars. The system, (2)and(4)-(15), constitutes themodel ofthis paper.
Equation (9) says that the world market for rice is in equilibrium.
Since the trade balance is zero at each point of time, equilibrium in
the market for rice implies equilibrium in the market for new cars, by
Walras’ law.
3. Simplifying the Model
The model just presented is quite complicated. To obtain sharp
results, we must make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we
assumethatthe outputsof rice andcars areconstant inboth countries,
and we denote them by ® > 0 (resp. ®¤ > 0) and ¯ > 0 (resp. ¯
¤ > 0)
TheGNP functions arethus Y (p) = ®p+¯ and Y ¤(p) = ®¤p+¯
¤: This
is the case if each good is produced by industry-speci…c factors alone.
Second, there is no international di¤erence in the rate of depreciation,A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 7
i.e., ± = ±
¤ > 0: Third, the felicity function of the representative agent
in each country is assumed to be quasi-linear
u(c;B) = ´lnc+ B (16)
u¤(c¤;B¤) = ´¤lnc¤ +B¤ (17)
From these assumptions, the model can be rewritten as follows
²



















¡ ¸p = 0 (22)
´¤
c¤ ¡ ¸
¤p = 0 (23)
c+ c
¤ = ®+ ®
¤ (24)
The dynamic system can be simpli…ed further. Let S(t) = A(t) +
A¤(t) denote the sum of the two stocks of cars. First, from (17), (18)




= (¯ + ¯
¤) ¡ ±S(t), (25)
then the time path of S(t) is independent of tari¤ policies and of
preferences:




(26)A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 8
Without loss, we can concentrate on the time pro…le of A(t), because
once A(t) is known, we can obtain A¤(t) = S1+(S0¡S1)e¡±t¡A(t).
Second, (20) means that if ¸(0) and ¸¤(0) are chosen as 1
½+± and
1
½¤+±, respectively, ¸(t) = 1
½+± and ¸¤(t) = 1
½¤+± for all t > 0: Since the
Hamiltonian associated with the dynamic optimization by the repre-
sentative household in the foreign country is concave with respect to
c¤; B¤ and A¤ under (16) and (18), the standard su¢ciency condi-
tions3 ensures us that the representative household behaves optimally
under these choices of ¸(0) and ¸
¤(0); respectively, provided A(t) is
bounded.
Letus therefore choose¸(0) = 1
½+± and ¸
¤(0) = 1
½¤+±. Not only does
this choice simplify the mathematical manipulations, it also makes
much economic sense. If we think of A(0) as the stock of wealth of the
household, then ¸(0) measures the marginal contribution of wealth to
thewelfare of thehousehold. That is, it measures howmuch additional
welfare the household would gain if we give it an additional car. Since
an additional car given at time 0 yields a service ‡ow at the rate e¡±t
at time t;(0 ￿ t ￿ 1), and since one unit of service ‡ow at t yields
e¡½t units of felicity, the present value of the stream of felicity obtained
from the additional car is
1
½+±.
With these choices, we derive from (12) the home and foreign de-








p(t) , respectively4, where x ´
´(½+±)
T and x¤ ´
´¤(½¤+±)
T¤ . Substituting




This equation shows howthe equilibrium terms of trade depend on (i)
the tari¤ rates ¿ and ¿¤, (ii) the rates of time preferences ½ and ½¤,
(iii) the depreciation rate ±, and (iv) the parameters ´ and ´¤ which
are measures of the substitutability of rice for cars. Notice that the
3See, for example, Leonard and Long (1992, Chapter 9).
4Hence, the elasticities of demand for rice are unity in each country.A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 9
demand function for rice is “almost” static, it depends only on the
current terms of trade p(t), and the current tari¤ rates, and the rates
of time preference and depreciation (the only intertemporal elements).
Initial wealth does not appear in the function, nor does the output of
cars. This, of course, is due to the assumption of a quasi-linear felicity
function5.
After substitution for p;c and ¢ in (17), the di¤erential equation
for A(t) becomes:
²





Let us assume that each government seeks to maximize the welfare of



























































where S(t) is an exogenous time path, given by (24b).
5In a model of the optimal tari¤ on exhaustible resources, Kemp and Long
(1980), using a quasi-linear utility function, obtain a similar result: the tari¤
rate is a constant. However, they show that, because of the exhaustibility of the
resource, such a constant tari¤ rate is feasible only with precommitment, without
which the time-inconsistency problem will arise. In the present model, there is no
time-inconsistency.A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 10
4. The Optimum Tari¤
Let us assume for the moment that the foreign government does
not change the tari¤ rate ¿¤. We can then easily obtain the optimum
tari¤ rate of the home country. For a given x¤, the home optimum





































®+ ®¤ = 0 (31)
²
¹ = (½ + ±)¹ ¡ 1 (32)
lim
t!1A(t)e





x(x +x¤)2 < 0;
the Hamiltonian Hg is strictly concave in x and concave in x and A.
Therefore, su¢ciency conditions for optimality are assured, and we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal solution to the above problem is as follows.




for any t ¸ 0 (34)A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 11









































Based on the lemma, we derive the optimum tari¤ rate.
Remark 2: Strictly speaking, we must require that A1 be non-
negative. This means that ¯ must be su¢ciently great.
Proposition 1:For a given foreign tari¤ rate T ¤, the home opti-










´¤(½¤+±) and D ´ ®
®¤. It follows from (35) that the home
optimum tari¤ rate rises if C and T ¤ increase and/or D decreases.
Proof: Omitted.
Remark 3: Formula (35) makes sense. For example, if the two
countries are identical in preferences (´ = ´¤ and ½ = ½¤ so that
C = 2) and if the foreign country adopts free trade (T¤ = 1); then the
home country’s tari¤ on rice will be positive if ® < ®¤: If ® increases
toward ®¤, the tari¤ will fall steadily to zero (i.e., T falls toward 1).
If the home rate of time preference rises, then the tari¤ on rice will
also rise. More generally, we can interpret (35) as the home country’s
“reaction function”. Recall that T = (1+ ¿) and T¤ = (1¡ ²) where
² is the foreign country’s export tax on rice (or, in view of Lerner’s
symmetry, ￿´ ²=(1¡²)istheforeigntari¤oncars). As ²increases, theA Differential Game Model of Tariff War 12
optimal ¿ decreases; thus the reaction function ¿ = ¿(²) is downward





if C ￿ 2
p
1 +2(1 +D)CT¤.
5. A Markov-perfect Equilibrium Pair of Tari¤ Strategies
Now let us assume that both governments play a tari¤ game. The
strategy space from which each country can choose its strategy is re-
stricted to the set of functions which map the current values of the
state variables (A(t);A¤(t)) to the set of positive real numbers, which
are the tari¤ factors T(t) and T¤(t). This restrictionmeans that we do
not allow punishments that are based on the full history of the game.
In particular, trigger strategies6 (which say that if “you deviate from
cooperative behaviour, I will punish you, and if you continue to coop-
erate, I will cooperate”) are not permitted. Restricting strategies this
way amounts to assuming that the only manner in which history can
a¤ect the present is through the “summary statistics” (A(t);A¤(t)).
Basically, we do not allow strategies that condition current actions on
the full history because we know, from the folk theorem on in…nitely
repeated games, that, if the rate of discounts are su¢ciently small,
almost any outcome (including full cooperation) can be sustained as
Nash equilibria. We think that this is quite unrealistic, in view of the
observed absence of completely free trade in the world.






















6For a treatment of these strategies in di¤erential games, see Dockner et al.
(2000).A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 13





















®+ ®¤ = 0 (42)
and
²




















®+ ®¤ = 0 (44)
²
º













Thus, aMarkov-perfect equilibrium strategy pair (x(A); x¤(A)) is that
of constant strategies, x(A) ´ x and x¤(A) ´ x¤; where x and x¤ are
positive, constant over time and independent of A. Substituting them







® + ®¤ =
®¤











Note that if º(0) and º¤(0) are chosen as 1/(½+±) and -1/(½¤+±); so
are º(t) and º¤(t): Considering the de…nitions of x and x¤; we have


















































Note that T increases if
´(½+±)
´¤(½¤+±) increases or if ®
®¤ decreases.
Remark 4: The equilibrium tari¤ pair depends on the two rates of
time preference, the rate of depreciation, the ratio of rice productions,
and the parameters of substitution in consumption. Small changes
in the parameters ¯ and ¯
¤ do not a¤ect the equilibrium tari¤ rates.
(Theroleplayed by ¯ and¯
¤ is that they lie ina certain subset ofR2 to
ensure that A(t) and A¤(t) are non-negative; they do a¤ect the welfare
levels, as can be seen from the value functions in the Appendix.)
6. The Welfare E¤ects of Equilibrium Tari¤s
Based on the foregoing argument, we check how the imposition of
tari¤ would a¤ect the welfare level of each country.
First, assume that x and x¤ are positive and constant. Solving the
di¤erential equation (25) with the initial condition A(0) and substi-
tuting the solution A(t;A(0)) into (26) and (27), we can derive the
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Figure 1 shows the indi¤erence map of W(x;x¤)7. Note that the locus
Wx(x;x¤) ´ @
@xW(x;x¤) = 0 is the home reaction curve and that
the intersection of the two loci, Wx(x;x¤) = 0 and Wx¤(x;x¤) ´
@
@x¤W(x;x¤) = 0, is a saddle point. Thus, there are two indi¤er-
ence curves both of which cross the intersection of Wx(x;x¤) = 0 and
Wx¤(x;x¤) = 0, say Q. Since for any x¤ > 0 W( ®
®¤x¤;x¤) = WA; one of
the two indi¤erence curves is x = ®
®¤x¤: The other indi¤erence curve
is depicted as mm0: A parallel observation can be made for the foreign
welfare function W¤(x;x¤).
Second, let us consider the autarchic welfare level of each country.




[´ln(®) + A]exp(¡½t)dt (53)
and
²






















as the autarchic welfare level of the foreign country. One can verify
that W(x;x¤) = WA and W¤(x;x¤) = W¤
A for any point on the line
®¤x = ®x¤ and mm0 in Figure 1.
Making use of W(x;x¤); W¤(x;x¤); WA and W¤
A, we shall compare
the welfare level of each country among the following four cases.
7To save space, we do not explain how to depict the …gures that appear in this
section, which is available from the authors on request.A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 16
(i) Autarchy
(ii) Free trade: T = T¤ = 1, which mean that x = ´(½ + ±) and
x¤ = ´¤(½¤ +±)
(iii) Unilateral optimum tari¤: T¤ = 1 and T = T op, which mean
that x = ´(½+ ±)=T op and x¤ = ´¤(½¤ +±)
(iv) Bilateral optimum tari¤s (a Markov-perfect equilibrium
pair of tari¤ strategies): T = T and T¤ = T
¤
, which mean
that x = ´(½+ ±)=T and x¤ = ´¤(½¤ + ±)=T
¤
6.1. The symmetric case: ® = ®¤, ½ = ½¤ and ´ = ´¤
First of all, let us consider the symmetric world in which ® = ®¤,


































Since ® = ®¤, the 45±-line x = x¤ in the (x;x¤)- plane is an indi¤er-
ence curve the welfare level of which is equal to the autarchic level
WA(= W¤
A). And since ´(½ + ±) = ´¤(½¤ + ±), and since Proposition
1 and Proposition 2 ensure us that Top = 1, and T = T
¤
= 1 in the
symmetric world, we see that the welfare level of each country is the
same among the four cases (i)-(iv).
6.2. The case in which the two countries di¤er only in ® and ®¤
If ® 6= ®¤ while ´ = ´¤ and ½ = ½¤, i.e., if only the output of rice











































Figure 2A depicts the reaction curves of the two countries under
® > ®¤. Inspection of the …gure exhibits that
1A The free-trade equilibrium (point EA) and tari¤-ridden equilib-
rium points (unilateral optimum tari¤ points FA and F¤
A and
bilateral optimum tari¤ point GA) are Pareto-superior to the
autarchic equilibrium for each country. Thus, trade gains are
con…rmed, irrespective of free trade or tari¤-ridden trade8.
2A The unilateral optimum tari¤ point FA (resp. F¤
A) makes the
home (resp. foreign) country better o¤ and the foreign (resp.
home) country worse o¤, compared with the free trade and bi-
lateral tari¤ points EA and GA.
3A The free-trade equilibrium point EA and all the three tari¤-
ridden equilibrium points GA, FA and F¤
A are below the line
®¤x = ®x¤, i.e., ®¤=® < x¤=x =
´(½+±)=pT¤
´(½+±)=pT = c¤=c; which means
that the home country exports rice and imports cars9. x is
greater than ´(½ + ±) at points GA and FA, while x¤ is smaller
than ´(½ + ±) at points GA and F¤
A, which implies that T < 1
at GA and EA and T¤ > 1 at GA and E¤
A. Thus, the home
and foreign countries imposes import tari¤s on cars and rice,
respectively.
What remains is the welfare comparison between the free-trade
equilibrium (point EA) and the bilateral optimum tari¤ equilibrium
8Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that any indi¤erence curve in the area PQm0
has a higher value of W than the indi¤erence curves mm0 and OP. We can make
a parallel argument for the comparison of the level between W ¤.and W ¤
A:





® ) = ®=c. Hence ®¤=® < c¤=c is equivalent to ® ¡ c > 0.A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 18
(point GA). Let us consider the sign of
½
´
























For any given ®¤ > 0, we observe that GA(0;®¤) = 1; GA(®¤;®¤) = 0
and GA(1;®¤) = ¡ln2 < 0: The partial di¤erentiation of GA(®;®¤)
















































































: Second, considering Descartes’ rule
ofsign, it follows that there exists aunique positive real number
p
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Basedontheforegoinganalysis, we can depict the graphofGA(®;®¤)
like Figure 3. There exists a unique
¼
























Thus we derive the following result.
4A There is a threshold for the parameter value
¼
® > ®¤ such that if
® is not equal to ®¤ and smaller (resp. larger) than
¼
®; the free-
trade equilibrium is better (worse) than the bilateral optimum-
tari¤ equilibrium for the home country. Aparallel statement can
be made for theforeigncountry. Thatis, free trade is better than
tari¤-ridden trade to each country unless the output of rice in
the country is su¢ciently greater than that of the other country.
6.3. The case in which the two countries di¤er only in ½ and ½¤
If ½ 6= ½¤ while ® = ®¤and ´ = ´¤, i.e., if only the rate of time



































Figure 2B depicts the reaction curves of the two countries under ½ >
½¤. Inspection of the …gure reveals that
1B The free-trade equilibrium (point EB) as well as the tari¤-ridden
equilibrium points (unilateral optimum tari¤ points FB and F ¤
B
and bilateral optimum tari¤ point GB) are Pareto-superior toA Differential Game Model of Tariff War 20
the autarchic equilibrium at which the welfare levels are W(x;x)
and W¤(x¤;x¤) for the respective countries. Trade gains are
con…rmed, both for free trade and for tari¤-ridden trade.
2B The unilateral optimum tari¤ point FB (resp. F¤
B) makes the
home (resp. foreign) country better o¤ and the foreign (resp.
home) country worse o¤, compared with the free trade and bi-
lateral tari¤ points EB and GB.
3B All the three tari¤-riddenequilibrium points andfree-trade equi-
librium points are above the line x = x¤; which means that the
home country (=the more impatient country) exports cars and
imports rice. x is smaller than ´(½ + ±) at points GB and FB,
while x¤ is greater than ´(½ + ±) at points GB and F¤
B, which
implies that T > 1 at GB and FB and T¤ < 1 at GB and F¤
B.
Thus, the home and foreign countries impose import tari¤s on
rice and cars, respectively.
What remains is the welfare comparison between the free-trade
equilibrium (point EB) and the bilateral optimum tari¤ equilibrium
(point GB). Considering that (x;x¤) = (´(½ + ±);´(½¤ + ±)) at point



































(½+ ±)+ (½¤ +±)
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Making virtually the same argument as we did for GA(½ + ±;½¤ + ±),


























We arrive at the following result
4B Thereisa thresholdfor theparametervaluee e ´ > ½¤+± suchthat if
½ is not equal to ½¤ and is smaller (resp. larger) than
¼
½; the free-
trade equilibrium is better (worse) than the bilateral optimum-
tari¤ equilibrium for the home country. Aparallel statement can
be made for theforeigncountry. Thatis, free trade is better than
tari¤-ridden trade to each country unless the output of rice in
the country is su¢ciently greater than that of the other country.
Finally, we note that the case in which the two countries di¤er only
in ´ and ´¤ is parallel to the present case in the sense that there exists
e e ´ that plays the same role as e e ½: The exercise is left to the reader.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have been able to derive explicitly a bilateral optimum-tari¤
equilibrium pair of strategies for a dynamic game model of tari¤-war
in a two(-country) by two(-good) dynamic general equilibrium model
where assets are accumulated.
The model is subject to a number of restrictive assumptions and
speci…cations. In particular, the assumption of quasi-linear felicity
functions is crucial for obtaining the equilibrium pair of strategies.
However, to our knowledge, this paper is the …rst attempt to derive
explicitly a feedback-Nash equilibrium solution to a dynamic tari¤-
setting game and therefore we believe that it makes some contributionA Differential Game Model of Tariff War 22
to the trade literature on tari¤ in the sense that it opens a door to a
more general dynamic analysis of tari¤ war.
We would also like to emphasize that the rates of time preference of
both countries play an important role not only in the determination of
the equilibrium tari¤ pair but also in the welfare comparison between
thefree-trade equilibrium andthe bilateral optimum-tari¤ equilibrium
for each country. These are in sharp contrast with static models.
APPENDIX
Appendix A1: Optimal Tari¤ (The HJB approach)
Assume that the foreign tari¤ is …xed, so that x¤ is given. The
home country’s task is to …nd the time path x(t) which maximizes
Z 1
0
[´ln(x) + ´ln(x+ x¤) +A]e¡½tdt
subject to









A(0) = A0; A(t) ¸ 0:
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for this problem is
½V(A) = max
x
[´ln(x) +´ln(x + x¤)+ A+ V 0(A)(¯ ¡ ±A ¡ °x+ µx¤)]
Let us try the functional form V(A) = QA+W, where Q and W are
constants to be determined. Then the HJB equation becomes
½QA+½W = max
x [´ln(x) +´ln(x +x
¤) + A+ Q(¯ ¡ ±A ¡ °x+ µx
¤)](62)A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 23





















´ b x (64)
Substituting (4) into (2),





+ Q(¯ ¡ °b x+ µx¤)




































[¯ ¡ °b x+ µx¤]
which is positive if ¯ is su¢ciently great. (We assume this.) The
transversality condition is satis…ed:
lim
t!1e
¡½tV (A(t)) = 0:
Appendix A2: Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (The
HJB approach)A Differential Game Model of Tariff War 24
Now we look at the optimization problem of the foreign country.











A¤(t) = S(t)¡ A(t) (68)
and S(t) is the sum of the two stocks of cars, its time path given by
S(t) = S1+(S0¡S1)e







The maximization is subject to
_ A = ¯ ¡ ±A¡ °x(A) +µx
¤

























Since © is a constant, it can be ignored, and we can write the HJB














Similarly, the HJB equation for the home country is




0(A)(¯ ¡ ±A ¡ °x+ µx
¤(A))](71)
The equations (10) and (11) de…ne the di¤erential game. To solve
thisgame, weconjecture that bothcountries choosea stock-independent
strategy:
x(A) = ¹ x ; x
¤(A) = ¹ x
¤ (72)
and we conjecture that
V(A) = QA+ W; V ¤(A) = Q¤A+ W¤
























The two equations simultaneously determine ¹ x and ¹ x¤.
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